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ABSTRACT 
Sufficient conditions for the stability of competitive equilibrium 
in a pure trade economy with externalities are developed in this paper. 
Externalities are introduced through the assumption that each individual's 
utility depends on the consumption of every other individual. A two­
level adjustment :-1."ocess is postulated. At fixed prices, individual 
strategies must be made mutually consistent. Each individual's 
strategy is stated as a relation which maps prices and the demands 
of all other individuals into the demand of that individual. The equlib­
rium of the externality adjustment process is a demand allocation, 
depending on price, which is feasible and maximizes utility for each 
individual at given prices. Sufficient conditions for stability of the 
externality adjustment process are proved and interpreted. 
The equilibrium demand functions are then used in a til.tonne­
ment process to investigate the stability of competitive equilibrium. 
All the standard theorems on excess demand functions \vhich give 
sufficient conditions for stability apply to the equilibrium demand 
functions of an economy with externalities. It is established that 
the stability properties of an economy without externalities possess 
a certain type of continuity. Any sequence of economies with exter­
nalities which converges in the proper sense to an economy without 
externalities characterized by gross substitutability has the property 
that for all t > T the competitive equilibrium of the economy with 
externalities is stable. Weaker stability conditions on the limit 
economy can make this theorem fail. 
STABILITY OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
WITH EXTERNALITIES 
W. David Montgomery 
1. INTRODUCTION AND NOTATION 
In analyzing the stability of competitive equilibrium with 
externalities, notation itself can impose a heavy burden on the 
reader since large matrices of second derivatives appear. Therefore 
a self-contained section introducing notation appears appropriate. 
Individuals are indexed by the superscripts i and j, commodities by 
the subscripts k and ol. There are n individuals and m commodities. 
Vector inequalities are >>, >, and� with their usual meaning, 
the m x m  identity matrix, and the transpose of A is written AT. 
I m 
All 
vectors start out as row vectors, but to simplify notation the inner 
product a • b T will be written ab.
is 
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Consider a pure trade economy 
1 n l  _Jl. E = {U (w), • • •  , U (w). X , • • • , x ) 
l 
in which the utility of each individual depends on his own cOnsumption 
and on the consumption of everyone else. Competitive equilibrium of 
this economy is a price vector p * and a consumption allocation w* 
such that 
(a) P�' � 0
(b) l:(xi�' -Xi)< O 
i -
(c) xi�' maximizes U
i(xi,wi* subject to p'�'X� < p*Xi. 
In a more complete model [ 2 ]  Arrow and Hahn prove the existence of 
competitive equilibrium for such an economy with assumptions weaker 
than the following, which we adopt. 
(D) (Differentiability) Ui(w) is continuously twice differentiable,. 
(Q) {Strict quasi-c
.
ancavity) [V�Ui] is negative definite wherever 
' . . 
evaluated under the. constraint p(x1 - x1°) = 0. 
(N) (Nansatiatian) Ui(xi, w i) > J-(�i, w i) if xi > 2.i. 
\Ve will establish conditions for the stability of equilibrium 
of this economy, relying for existence of equilibrium on the proof 
in [2]. 
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The stability of an economy without externalities can be 
analyzed without going behind excess demand functions which are 
assumed to be continuous and single valued. In the case of externalities 
individual demand for a good is not well defined as a function of p alone, 
so that _simple summation of individual demand to obtain aggregate 
demand is not possible, Choices of all agents must be consistent in 
the sense of condition (c) of equilibrium. We formulate the problem 
as one in \vhich two separate adjustment processes are at work. In 
the first, called the "exter.nality adjustment process," prices are fixed. 
Given these prices, each individual maximizes utility in the belief 
that the current choices of all other individuals will remain unchanged. 
To illustrate the type of adjustment involved, consider an exchange 
economy with two individuals and two goods. Straightforward utility 
maximization gives individual one's demand for each good as a function 
of prices and individual two's demands: 
I 2 2 xl = f1(P1•Pz•x1,x2) 
1 
x2 
2 .2 
fz(P1 • Pz•x1 ,xzl 
If each individual satisfies his budget constraint with equality, Walras1 
Law implies that only one market, say. for good one, need be' considered, 
since demand for good two is uniquely determined by �ach individual 1 s 
demand for good one. Si.nee prices are fixed, we are left with a system 
I 2 
x l = ¢(xl)· 
2 " I). 
xl = i:{�l • 
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Suppose that from any arbitrary starting point each individual 
adjusts his demand according to a gradient rule 
. I xi 
2 I g(o(x1) - x1) 
• 2 xi 
I 2 h{'±'(x1) - x1) 
where g and h are arbitrary monotonic Increasing functions. Olech1s 
theorem (7] states that necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
global stability of this system are 
g' + h1 '> 0
g1h1[l - ¢1'±'1] > 0
I 2 for all x1 ,x1• 
Since g' > 0 and h1 > 0, stability depends only on having 
¢'1¥' < 1. 
If the externality is symmetric, in the sense that ¢1 and If' are of 
the same sign, then a magnitude restriction on the effect of the 
externality is needed to have stability. In particular, a restriction 
will be imposed on how one individuaPs marginal rate of substitution 
between goods one and two in his own consumption is changed by 
changes in the other individual's demand fo-r good one. 
Two special cases are illuminating. Suppose J¢1 j > l and 
!1¥'J > l and sgn ¢1 = sgn 'f1, Then changing two's consumption of
good one by one unit causes individual one to change his consumption 
by� than one unit, and similarly, for the obverse case. The 
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explosive character of such a situation is clear. Conversely, suppose 
that individual one1s demand is unaffected by individual two's choices. 
Then ¢' = 0, and the system is always stable. 
The equilibrium consumption levels reached by thi:;; externality 
adjustment process will not result in the clearing .of all markets if 
prices are chosen arbitrarily. A second adjustment process in which 
p converges to an equilibrium value is also needed. 
A tiftonnement process in the markets for commodities is 
assumed. ' When prices are announced, each individual acts as if he 
can buy and sell any quantity. Each individual announces to the 
auctioneer and to all other individuals his desired purchases and sales. 
Before another price is announced, the offers are allowed to converge 
to a Nash equilibrium by means of the adjustment process outlined 
above. If this process is stable, the tatonnement can proceed. The 
stability of competitive equilibrium under t'ltonnement will depend 
only on the behavior of equilibrium offers at each price vector. 
A general representation of such a two-level adjustment process can 
now be stated. 
The externality adjustment process depends entirely on 
properties of individual utility 'functions. Three fundamental theorems 
are proved: the existence of consistent individual strategies, the 
uniqueness and continuity of equilibrium demand functions w(p) for p i:ri 
a neighborhood of p*, and sufficient conditions for the stability of an 
adjustment process by which demand converges to w{p) for fixed p. 
The excess demand functions are then used in defining stability of 
competitive equilibrium, which is exami.iied exclusively j.n terms of 
excess demand. 
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2. STABILITY OF EXTERNALITY ADJUSTMENT 
Each individual chooses xi to satisfy the following first-order 
conditions (written in vector notation). 
i v1u {w) - A1p = o (2.1) 
i _i p(x - x ) = 0 
By hypothesis each of the first-order conditions is Continuously 
differentiable, and from (N ) the budget constraint is an equality. 
Lemma 2. 1: The system given in {2. 1) has the property that for any 
wi and for p >> 0 there exists an xi which satisfies (2, l).
Since Ui is jointly continuous in all its arguments, it is 
continuous in xi for fixed wi 2::. O. Since the budget set {xi :pxi � p;f
and xi 2::. O} is compact, Ui attains its maximum for some xi in the
budget set for any fixed wi and p. I f
Lemma 2. 2: 
i _i px '.S_px}.
Let Xi(wi) ;;: {xi: xi maximizes 
Then for fi,xed p >> 0, Xi(wi) is 
continuous correspondence. 
uicJ,wi) subject to
an upper semi-
Proof: Debreu [SJ, p. 19 states the theorem that if f :  S x  T --?- R1 
is continuous and cp : S ____,. T is closed and continuous on S, then 
the set µ{x) of elements of cp(x) which maximize f on cp(x) is upper 
semicontinuous on S. The function Ui: Rm+ xRm(n-l)+ --'J!> Rl 
is continuous, and the: closed budget correspondence i:p(wi) 
;;: (xi: pxi :s_ p; and xi � O} is constant in (independent of)
wi and hence continuous. Hence the correspondence Xi(wi) is
upper semicontinuous since it is the set of elements of cp(wi) 
which maximize Ui on tp(wi). I !
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Since the Jacobian of 2. 1 is IL iHi Li/, which is nonvanishing
by Q, we can use the implicit function theorem to prove that there 
exists an open neighborhood N(W) such that for any W-, Xi(w) is a
single-valued funcf:ion on N(-\V), Since for a function upper semi­
continuity is equivalent to continuity, this implies that there is one, 
and only one, continuous function x\wi) which satisfies (2. 1 ).
These lemmas establish properties of each individual's 
optimal choice given arbitrary values of the choices of all other 
individuals. It remains to establish the existence of mutually 
consistent optimal choices when prices are set arbitrarily. 
Theorem 2.1: There exists a w such that (2.1) is satisfied by w 
simultaneously for all i whenever p >> 0, 
i i i _i i Proof: Let T = fx : px � px. and x � O}. i i i iLetD (w)={x:xET 
and Ui{x
i,wi) > Ui(Qi,wi) for all �i E T1}, where it is understood that 
Di(w) is indep�dent of the values chosen for the ith component vector 
of w. Note that Di(w) = x\wi) for any choice of x1• By Lemma ,,z.1 and
(N) for any w
i 
and p there exists xi<< «> (since p >> 0) such that 
xi E Di(w), and by Lemma 2, 2, D
i 
is upper semicontinuous.
Let -i x k
___i 
� 
pk
i = l ,  , , • , n, k = 1, ., , m, 
,.... i ,J and let \V = {w:O � xk � xk}.
n i '"" Clearly X D c W for all w, so that 
i=l 
the image of the restriction of � Di to W is also contained in W.
i= l 
Let the 
restriction be represented byi3':W---+. W. Since W is close·d, bounded, 
and convex, upper semicontinuity of ff is sufficient to satisfy the
conditions of Kakutani1s fixed-point theorem [2], Therefore there 
""' "' . n M exists a w* € W such that w* E D(w*) = I; D (w*). Since 2.1 are
i=l 
necessary conditions satisfied by any w* E D{w*), it follows that 
ao1U:tions of 2.1 exist. 11
10 
To find conditions on Ui which imply the existence of a
unique function w(p) satisfying (2. 1) we observe that the functions 
(2.1) are continuously differentiable in w, and apply the implicit 
function theorem again. We call a single-valued function w{p) which 
maps p into the solutions of (2. 1) an equilibrium demand function. 
Theorem 2.2: If A is nonsingular then there exists a neighborhood 
of the equilibrium price vector N(p*) such that for all p E N(p*) there 
exist single-valued, contilluously differentiable equilibrium demand 
functions w(p). 
Proof: By assumption (N), p�' will be strictly positive. (lip* = 0 for�� k 
some k, any individual can increase his utility indefinitely by demanding 
more of good k, ) Therefore in some small neighborhood of p *, N(p *), 
p is strictly positive if p E N(p*), so that Theorem 2.1 establishes 
the existence of solutions to 2. l, 
The theorem now follows as a restatement of the implicit 
function theorem [l J. The determinant I LAL I is the Jacobian of system
(2, 1 ), and LAL is nonsingular if and only if A is nonsingular. 
Since each function ui. (2. 1) is continuously differentiable, and since
by Theorem 2. 2 we kno\V that there exist solutions of z. l ), the hypoth­
esis of the implicit function theorem is satisfied when !Al # 0, ! J 
The nonsingularity of A is a real restriction, in that it is not- i implied by other assumptions regarding the quasi-concavity of the U ,  
which relate only to the diagonal blocks and associated bordering vectors, 
i 
equal to viu, Of A. 
Since unique equilibrium demand functions exist for all 
p E N{p*), it is possible to ask if, for fixed p, the Nash equilibrium is 
stable. Consider the following general adjusbnent process: 
Xi = 'V.Ui(w) - A..p ' ' 
0 p • (xi - xii
(2. 2) 
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where p is the fixed price vector. Note that if Ui depended only on xi
this would be a gradient process by which each individual could find 
his private utility maximum given p under the constraint that his budget 
constraint be satisfied exactly at every instant. In the case of exter­
:nalities, however, the gradient ?.Ui is continuously altered by the. . 
changing consumption plans of other agents. If w1 is fixed, for each 
individual this process is equivalent to the modified gradient process 
of Arrow and Solow [3]. By further modifying their process, we can 
use their proof of local convergence of the gradient process to the 
maximum to prove the local stability of (2, 2), We prove local 
stability by taking a Taylor series approximation to (2. 2), expanding 
around the Nash equilibrium Values. If this linear appr?ximation is 
asymptotically stable, (2, 2) is locally stable. 
The linear approximation of (2, 2) 
. i i "' i ...,,i T ,(to T 
VV.U {w) • {w - w )  - (/..  - A.)p x • • • 
i i 0 = -p(x - � ). 
. i
From (2. 3), px = 0, Hence 
, i i I'\, i Ai T
px = pvv
i
u (w){w - w )  
and we can solve for 
� T 
(Ai 
- )"i)pp =· 0 � 
.e. T -1 i,,.. ,,.,. T (A. - X.) = (pp ) pVV.U (w)(w - w) • • • 
Qi{w _ Q)
T
.
(2. 3) 
(2.4) 
(2. 5) 
Each Q. is a 1 x m row vector. Define Q as the n x m matrix• 
whose i
th row is Q . •  Then (2.3) and (2,4) can be written, when• 
A -1. is eliminated by Z. 5, as• 
w {[vv,u\�)]· - ITQ){w - �). • (2. 6) 
Th.ese mn differential equations have only mn - m degrees 
of freedom. 
Let µ be a root 0£ the equation 
[vv. Uil<::i) - µI ] • mn 
12 
ITT
Det (µ) = - - - - L. 0 • I 2 .  6) 
TI 0 
We can now state the fundamental stability theorem. 
Theorem 2, 3: If the real parts of the roots of Det (µ) are negative, 
then (2. 2) is locally stable, i.e. it is stable in any region in which 
the linear approximation of (2, 3) and (2.4) is valid, 
�: We demon-trate that 2.6 is a�ymptotically stable, Choose as
a candidate solution w - � = Ceµt. Then C must satisfy Il-C = 0 
i� w - �is to satisfy the budget constraint (2.4), Also, to satisfy 
(2. 6) we must have 
eµt([VV. U
i
(�)]C + ITQC) • µCe
µt.
Putting these conditions together, C and µ must satisfy 
[ [vv.ui(<::i)-µI ] • mn 
- - - - - - - - t-
n 
ITT 
l [ :� -] 0 
0 . 
This system of h"amogeneous linear equationi; has a solution if and 
only if the determinant of the left-hand side matrix, Det{µ), vanishes. 
If the real parts of all the roots of Det (µ) = 0 are negative, then (2. 6} 
is asymptotically stable. I J 
To give some economic sense to the condition that Det (µ} = 0 
have roots with negativ:e r�al parts we give two very restrictive 
i i ri(V ) < 0, we can choose an e > 0 such that the real part of µ(U ) 
is also negative. 
We have by.this argument proved the following theorem: 
Theorem 2. 5: There exists a number e > 0 such that if 
0 < a
2ui(0) 
i j Bxkaxt 
< e 
for all w, for i :/ j, and for all k and ,f,, the Nash equilibrium is 
stable. 
A simpler argument establishes that the Nash equilibrium 
is stable if all externalities .are uni-directional, that is, if u 1 is a 
function of x 1 alone, u2 a function of x 
1 
and x 2, u3 a function of 
l 2 3 n . . x , x , x , and so on up to U a function of w. In this case 
Det{µ) has a block triangular form, since [v .v.u1] = 0 for j > i. J ' 
I 5 
The determinant of a block triangular matrix is equal to the product 
of the determinants of the diagonal blocks [6 ]. That is 
2 l T v 1 u -µIn p 
p 0 
. 2 v 1 v2u 0 
0 
vlv n u11 0 
0 
-' 
., 
,_ 
0 
- - . - -
2 2 
v2u - µIm p 
p 
. -
v2vn u11 
0 
0 
. -
0 
- . ' -T 
. ,_ - ' 
0 
0 
.. 
Ln T V u - µI p n m 
p 0 
n 
IT 
i= 1 
[•V-i• , : ,'I I- - ,_ - - � � -
p ' 0 
= 0 
Each of these factors bas only real negative roots by Q, 
Any root µi of each factor in the product is a root or'the product. 
This gives us n(m - 1) roots, which are all the roots µ, and 
establishes the following theorem, 
16 
J I  2 2  _ _n Theorem 2.6: If U = U (x 1 ), U = U (x1,x2) .... u tf'{xl' . • • • xn)' 
then the Nash equilibrium is locally stable. 
Note thai the roots of 
[vv .u1 - µI ] ' m 
IT 
IT
T 
0 
0 
are invariant to a monotonic transformation of the utility function. 
Transform each utility furlction u1 by a monotonic increasing 
function F.(Ui). The tyPical element-of [vv.F1(U.)] then is ' ' ' 
i,j =l, • • .  n, 
a
zuiF.'--. -. + ' ' J axkax t
i i 
F" au � 
i i j • axk axt 
k,t=l, • • •  m. 
Becaus·e of the structure of the bordering matrix TI, we 
can use a bordering column multiplied by an appropriate scalar 
to eliminate all terms involving Fj_' in the usual fashion, 
factor all Fi terms out of the determinant, obtaining the 
and then 
result that 
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sufficient conditions, The first is that externalities be small relative 
to the curvature of the indifference surfaces of Ui(xi,wi) for fixed wi. 
If externalities are absent, then Ui{w) is in fact independent of wi 
and of the form Vi{x. ), In this case stability of the Nash equilibrium . . 
is a direct consequence of strict quasiconcavity. 
By assumption (Q). the roots Tli of 
v�
i('5t'i) - Tli Im 
T p 
' -
p 0 
are real and negative. Therefore the roots fl of 
2 1 T [v1 V 1�1) - Dim] P
p 0
0 
0
0
c 
' ' 
[ 2 2, ) J T , v2v (x2 - 11Im p , 
p 0
' 
- - - - -
., 
' - - - - - r 
0
0
0
_, 
0
·-
·rz n" T 1 Vn V {xn) - 'T')Im] P_
p 0 
are also i-eal and negatiVe. By rearranging rows and columns the 
above determinent can be put in the form 
0 
(2. 
[vv.V
i(�)- DI J ' mn 
IT 
ITT 
0
where all off diagonal blocks [v. V. Vi(�)] are identical1y zero • • J 
Now consider a utility function 
not i.ildependent of wi but such that 
a2ui(w) 
Ui{x.,w.) such that Ui is • • 
0 < . . < € • J axkax .e, 
for all if: j, for al: k, '4 and for fixed e: > O. 
By construction a
2Vi(w) 
i j axkax.e, 
a2ui(wl 
i j axkax .e, 
< e (2. 8) 
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for i f:. j. We can choose Vi such that the value of xi which maximizes 
Vi subject to the budget constraint is equal to the 5?i which is a Nash 
equilibrium value of the system with externalities. Let these Vi be
such that 
azui(�l 
i i axkax .t 
a2v'101 
i i axkax .e, 
< e. (2. 9)
i i Let µ(U ) denote a root of (2. 6) and let 71{V ) denote a root 
of (2. 7) when Vi is chosen as above, The modulus of a complex 
number is denoted 11 • [ /, Since a characteristic root of a matrix
is a continuous function of the elements of a matrix, it follows that 
for any 0 > 0 there exists an e > 0 such that if (2. 8) and (2. 9) are
satisfied with respect to. that e, I ]11(Vi) - µ(Ui)j j < &. Hence, since 
(ov.F.(Ui - µI ] ' ' m 
_ _ _ _ _  , 
IT 
(Fl, , . , . , F1 )m-2 n 
17 
ITT 
0 
i [Vl.\U - µIm] IT
T 
IT 0 
If a condition which is not invariant to a monotonic increasing 
i transformation is imposed on [vv.U J, a theorem on global stability ' . 
can be proved. The condition is that [VV.U1] be negative quasidefinite ' 
wherever evaluated, that is, that x([vv.ui] + [VV'.UiJT)xT < O for all x j:. O. ' ' 
This assumption implies that x[v�Ui]x1 < O for all x :f 0, or that . ' 
U1 is strictly concave. A process in which the budget constraint is 
not satisfied instantaneously and both xi and A
i vary explicitly over 
time, will be considered. 
Consider the following general ci.djustment process: 
'ix 
�. ' 
'V.Ui(w) - A.P ' . ' 
-p • {xi - X
i) 
(2. 10) 
where p is the fixed price vector. We find· a condition for .stability 
by direct application of Lyapunov1s second method. 
Theorem 2. 7: If [V'V.Ui] is negative quasi-definite, then (2.10) is ' 
globally stable (i.e. w converges to W from any initial w > O}. 
�: Form the function 
i ,..i 2 2V = i; [i; (xk - xk) ' k 
• 2 
+ (A. - A.) ] ' ' 
18 
where �k
i and 1. satisfy (2. 1) (i. e. �i and�. are equilibrium values). l . . l 
Clearly Vis positive except when x1 = X1, A. = 1., so that if V' < 0, ' ' 
V is a Lyapunov function, and the system 2. 2 is globaHy asymptotically 
stable (8]. 
V' 
dxi dA. 
�ri; 1 ,, k t' 1<: (xk - xk)dt + . ' (\ - Ai)dt] 
i; {i; l<x
i _ �i) (aU
i(w) 
. k k k 
. 
' a ' xk 
) (' �. i _, ]}- Aipk + Ai - Ai)pk(x·k - xk) 
Note that since 
V ' 
aui(w) - A.pk i ' axk 
(aui\wl 
axk 
aui(�l) + 1ipk - Aipk, axk 
!; {E(xi - �i) (aui(w) 
i k 
k k i 
.
axk 
_ au\�l) 
axk 
[ i ,i ' i _j • ]}+ ; (xk - xk) p,ipk - Aipk) + (pkxk - pkxk,) (),i - Ai). • 
The expression in ·square brackets expands to 
� i ,., "i � LAipkxk - Aipkxk -
i ;..i 
Aipkxk + AiPkxk 
i .-i ""  i ,., _i 
+ pkAixk - pkAixk - Aipkxk + Aipkxk] 
" ... i J) !: {A..(pkxk - pkxk k ' 
.... i _i )) + Ai(pkxk - pkxk 
19 
::: 0 since the budget constraint must be satisfied with equality 
in equilibrium. Therefore 
v1 = E[!:(x�
i k 
or in vector notation 
. i _ 5':1) (au (w) 
k . a ' xk 
au'i['> ) 
Jaxk 
V' I; {xj - �
i) (v.Ui(w}' v.U
i(�)). ' 
Let g lie on the line segment connecting w and�. 
by the mean value theorem 
[v.Ui(w) - V.Ui(�)J' ' 
i A v[v,u (g)J • (w - w)
for sorrJ.e such g. 
Therefore 
v' !:(xi - 5'.i) VV.Ui(g) • (w - W) 
i· l 
(w - �) [vv.Ui(i;)] (w - W) ' 
< O, since VVi U
i(�) is quasinegative. definite.
Then 
20 
3." STABILITY OF TATONNEMENT 
The demand functions derived in Section Z are sufficient 
to characterize the t8.tonnement process. As usual, let 
pk 
i _i g
i(�(xk(p) - xk)). (3. 1) ' 
We know that an equilibrium exists with Pk = 0 for all k. The function
� serves to define speeds of adjustment of prices. The equilibrium P * 
will be stable for all speeds of adjustment if and only if the matrix 
i ax1E -
i 8P1
M= I 
axi
i;;---"' 
i O
p l
. . . 
. . .
. . . 
i axl E -
i 8Pn 
ax
i 
i;;--" 
i 
apn
is D - stable, i.e. if and only if DM is stable for all D = 
diag (d1, . . .  , dn} with di
> 0. Since we are dealing only with excess
demand functions at this point, all the general theorems regarding 
sufficient {or necessary) conditions for D-stability of a matrix apply 
(see [8] or [9]). Thus, once the stability of the externality adjustment
process is established, there is nothing special about the case of 
externalities in terms of restrictions on the partial derivatives of 
excess demand functions. We can extend the theorem that when 
·externalities are small the Nash equilibrium is stable to show that 
uri.der certain conditions the stability properties of an economy without
externalities are preserved when small externalities are present. 
Perturbing p in the first-order conditions (Z. l )  and 
rearranging differential coefficients gives a system of equations 
LA LT • dX' dP 
where d.X 
and dP 
1 n (dx ••• dx , (dA1 • • • dAn) I 
i _i p,1dP, •• , , \ndP, (d(p(x - x })). 
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(3. 2) 
ax1 
This system of equations can be solved for -8 k in the usual fashion. p. . J 
a ' 
Let M be the matrix of derivatives [ 2:. a 
x
k 
l thus obtained. 1 pj -
A continuity theorem regarding stability of competitive 
equilibrium with externalities can be proved by observing what happens 
to (LALT f1 as the magnitude of external effects varies. An economy 
without externalities is denoted EO, and consists of a set of individuals 
each with a utility function V
i(xi) and endowment }. We relate this 
economy to the economy with externalities, E, by assuming that 
Ui(xi,wi} = Vi(xi) for all xi when externalities are absent, 
An economy with externalities, Et, will in general be an 
t 1 t�..n Ll Ln , . n + mn tuple [ U , , • u , x , . . x ] We will consider only 
economi�s in which initial endowments are identical, so that an 
economy Et is completely described as a collection of n utility functions. 
Consider a sequence of economies (EtJ;=l which converges to E O  in 
the sense that there exists a T0 such that if t > T0, 
max <!tUi(w) - Vi(w)f )< e for any s > O, .ind for all i. wEW . 
We will consider a specific class, e(Eo), of sequences (Et} 
which converge to EO with the following properties for each tui. 
A )  tHi = H'i for all t E (1, •.• , «>}, where 11l1 is 
the bo;der�d Hessian of the utility function tui and W the bordered 
Hessian of vi. 
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B) Let(¢ .. (t)] be a matrix whose elements are functions ¢k
ij,(t) l, J ..... 
such that ¢�t(t) converges monotonically to zero as t � "'• and let 
A .. be some m x m  matrix. Then for i -f j let v.v.
tui = [¢1 ,.(t)]@ A . . lJ J l  lJ lJ 
where-@ denotes the Hadamard (entry-wise) product, 
Under (A) and (B) the matrix •' - [ [•; "'
-
' :· ] 
converges in the maximum element norm 1 to 
Choose a permutation matrix.- B such tilat 
BAOB
T -1 -n diag (H , , .• , H } 
as t� ""• 
'.Ao 
rvt t T and let A = BA B • Let Mt be the matrix. of derivatives of excess 
demand functions found by solving 4.1 with A= At. and MO be a 
solution_ of 4.1 with A=A0• 
1, By the maximum element norm, we mean a scalar function of
a matrix A, f(A). such that f(A) = max la . . J (see [4}).
'i, j lJ 
Since a characterization of D- stability by necessary and 
sufficient conditions is lacking in the literature, and not apparently 
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in the offing, continuity of the stability properties of a sequence of 
economies must be done in terms of some specific sufficient conditions 
for stability . 
Theorem 3.1: If a sequence of economies {Et];=l is in the class e(EO) 
for an economy EO which has gross substitutability (GS), then there 
exists T G < "' such that Et has GS for all t > T G• 
Proof: Note that since the off-diagonal blocks of LA OL 
T are identically 
0 zero, we obtain M from so"lving 3.1, with 
...... o T -1 (LAL I 
(LlHl Ll )-1
0 
0 
• (LnHnLn)-1 
Since EO has GS, MO is quasi-dominant diagonal [9]. 
Each element in the inverse of a matrix M is a continuous 
function· of the elements of that matrix as long as M is nonsingular, 
since each element is the ratio of two nonzero polynomials, viz. the 
detern1inant of cofactor of M and the determinant of M. 
we 
By the same argument as that used in the previous section 
can. establish that there exists an e: sU:ch that if f{A t -·AO) < e, 
then the nonsingularity of the matrix AO implies the nonsingularity of 
At . Hence there exists a T such that At is nonsingular if t > T. 
"'t T i-i i By construction [LA L ]  converges to diag { L H L } in the maximum 
i�i i-i i -1 element norm, and the inverse of diag [ L H L } is diag f[ L H L ] } • 
. t 0 Since all elements of A are close to the elements of A in absolute 
value, by c·ontinuity each element of [At]-l is close to the corresponding 
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element of [A O]-l in absolute value. Let A�. be the i, j block of the 'J matrix At. In particular, for any 0 > 0, there exists an e1 such that by 
continuity of the inverse, f([A'.t]�.1) < 5 when f(A�.) < e' for all ii- j. lJ lJ Since £('.A�.) < e' for all i I j, £(At - '.A.
0) < e' since A�. =A� .• Hence lJ ll 11 for any 0 > 0 there exists an e1 > 0 such that for all t > T(e1), ""' -1 f(LA ] .. ) < 6 for i -f- j. 'J 
Mis a continuous function of {LAL)-l by {3.2). Therefore 
there exists a T(e) such that for all t > T(e:), no element of Mt differs 
0 from the corresponding element of M by more than e for any positive
e:. This is all we need to establish continuity of equilibrium. 
Since Mt is quasi-dominant diagonal, there exist positive 
weights c. such that 
J 
ci]m�il > I: c. Im�. Ii#j J lJ 
Choose� such that I; c.je! < Ec.Jm'?.1- I; c.lm�.1-
i'/-j J 'i 1 lJ i#j J lJ 
Then Mt is quasi-dominant diagonal, and Et is locally stable for 
all speeds of adjustment for all t > T(€) = TG, J I
t 00 0 Remark: If a sequence [E } t=l in the class e(E ) converges to an E 
which has sign stability, there may not be a T such that Et is sign-stable
for all t E T. The same remark holds if sign-stable is replaced with 
weak GS, The same example establishes both. Let the economy E 
have the matrix Of partial derivatives of excess demand functions with 
sign pattern 
[: + 
+ 
:1 
Then E is weak GS and sign stable • .  Let Et have matrix 
Mt= I 
with m,, > 0, all i, j. 
'l 
m
l l  
1 
;:--m21
t 
m31 
1 
Take {-;-} ---?> 0, 
t 
1 
n112 
�
m
l 3
1 
m
22 ut 
m
Z3 
m
32 
m
33 
1 1 [-}---?- 0, and{-}---?> O, and let st ut 
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each sequence be strictly �creasing. Then for any finite t, rt< O,
s
t
< 0, and u
t 
< 0, Mt is neither sign stable nor weak G S. 
A classical theorem on stability of competitive equilibrium 
is that no trade at equilibrium implies stability of equilibrium, The 
theorem is not true unless further conditions are imposed when there 
are externalities. In the classical case the theorem follows from the 
observation that the matrix of substitution terms is negative-definite 
and that with no trade at equilibrium income effects vanish [9]. 
It can be seen from (3.2) that the substitution ·terms of·tht'.­
equili�rium demand functions depend not on H
i but on A, and that 
in general the matrix of subs'titution terms is negative definite with 
externalities only if the off-diagonal blocks of A are small. With 
this assumption, the theorem can be proved. 
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